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NEW FORMS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RIGHTS- AND
DEMOCRACY-BASED WORRIES
Mark Tushnet*

Recent developments in judicial review have raised the
possibility that the debate over judicial supremacy versus
legislative supremacy might be transformed into one about
differing institutions to implement judicial review. Rather
than posing judicial review against legislative supremacy, the
terms of the debate might be over having institutions designed
to exercise forms of judicial review that accommodate both
legislative supremacy and judicial implementation of
constitutional limits.
After examining some of these
institutional developments in Canada, South Africa, and Great
Britain, this Article asks whether these accommodations, which
attempt to pursue a middle course, have characteristic
instabilities that will in the long run lead constitutional
systems back to wither judicial or legislative supremacy.

I. INTRODUCTION
Two models of constitutionalism were on offer in the last
century. One was the so-called Westminster model of parliamentary
supremacy, in which democratically elected legislatures had power
unconstrained by anything other than the cultural presuppositions
embedded in a majority's will. 1 The other was the United States
(''U.S.'') model of constrained parliamentarianism, as Bruce
Ackerman has labeled it. 2 In this model, the legislature's powers are
* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown
University Law Center.
1. These presuppositions could be unwritten, as in Great Britain, or
written into a constitution that could serve as a reference point for political
debate about whether a particular proposal was consistent with the culture's
presuppositions.
2. Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV.
633, 664-87 (2000) (describing some components of some systems of constrained
parliamentarianism). I use the somewhat more graceful term parliamentarism
here.

813

HeinOnline -- 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 813 2003

814

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

limited by the terms of a written constitution that courts will
enforce.
Each model promoted some values of liberal
constitutionalism and raised worries about others.
The
Westminster model maximally advanced democratic selfgovernance, but made it possible for empowered democratic
majorities to violate rights that liberal systems should protect. The
U.S. model gave the courts a wide-ranging power to invalidate
legislation on the ground that the legislation violated those rights,
but made it possible for reckless courts to interfere needlessly with
policy choices democratic majorities should be allowed to make.
For all practical purposes, the Westminster model has been
withdrawn from sale. This Article examines some aspects of the
Do the versions of liberal
situation that have resulted.
constitutionalism presently available do an acceptable job of
reconciling empowered democracy with protected rights? First, I
describe what I call strong-form judicial review, for which the
United States provides the primary example. Strong-form judicial
review generated a set of debates over judicial activism and judicial
restraint, which threaten to reproduce themselves in newer systems
of constrained parliamentarism. Following the example of Professor
Kent Roach, I point out that it would be a large mistake to structure
debates in some of the newer systems around the terms activism
and restraint, because some of these newer systems adopt what I
call weak-form judicial review. 3 Weak-form systems hold out the
promise of protecting liberal rights in a form that reduces the risk of
wrongful interference with democratic self-governance.
After
describing several types of weak-form review, I raise some questions
about the stability of weak-form judicial review as a version of
constrained parliamentarism. 4 My most important points are that
weak-form judicial review may degenerate into a return to
parliamentary supremacy or escalate into strong-form review, and

3. One might say that weak-form systems of judicial review are, by
definition, systems that design the institution of judicial review so that courts
are necessarily restrained, whereas in strong-form systems restraint results
from choices made by the judges themselves. I think this formulation is a bit
misleading, though, because judges in some weak-form systems can choose to be
as "activist" as judges in strong-form systems; weak-form systems differ from
strong-form ones because some weak-form systems have institutions that
supplement judicial review and produce a system of constitutional review that,
taken as a whole, reduces the role even the most activist-minded judges can
play in developing the actual restraints the constitution places on the
legislature.
4. Another essay, Mark Tushnet, Alternative Forms of Judicial Review,
101 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming Aug. 2003), continues my exploration of
differences between strong- and weak-form systems of judicial review.
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that there is some evidence that it will do one or the other, and
sometimes both. The promise that weak-form review may in
practice substantially reduce democracy-based concerns about
judicial review, that is, may not be fulfilled.

II.

WHY THE DEBATE BETWEEN ACTMSM AND RESTRAINT
MAy Now BE MISLEADING

Every constitution-maker in the past generation has adopted
some form of constrained parliamentarism, and at present Australia
and New Zealand provide the only significant examples of nations
committed to something even approaching the Westminster mode1. 5
For years, the only real alternative to parliamentary supremacy
appeared to be u.S.-style strong-form judicial review. Strong-form
judicial review generated its own debate, this one between advocates
of what was labeled judicial restraint and what was labeled judicial
activism. 6 Advocates of judicial restraint argued that restrained
courts would interfere with democratic self-governance only when
doing so was truly necessary; advocates of judicial activism argued
that a more aggressive posture was necessary to ensure that liberal
5. Even this has to be qualified. Australia's High Court does enforce the
federalist limitations on legislative power in the nation's constitution, and has
toyed with doctrines that would allow it to enforce some human rights on the
ground that the written constitution's commitment to government responsible
to the people presupposes such rights. Austl. Capital Television Proprietary,
Ltd. v. Australia (1992) 177 C.L.R. 106, 107-08 (Austl.) (invalidating a
campaign finance law as inconsistent with Australia's constitutional
commitment to representative government); Lange v. Austl. Broad. Corp. (1997)
189 C.L.R. 520, 520-21 (Austl.) (limiting Australian Capital Television
Proprietary, Ltd.). As for New Zealand, James Allan has argued perhaps a bit
too forcefully that New Zealand's judges have made that nation's Human Rights
Act, which on its face simply instructs judges to interpret statutes to be
consistent with basic human rights, into a document that gives judges authority
to displace legislative authority quite broadly. See, e.g., James Allan, The Effect
of a Statutory Bill of Rights Where Parliament is Sovereign: The Lesson from
New Zealand, in SCEPTICAL ESSAYS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 375 (Tom Campbell et al.
eds., 2001).
6. At times that debate seemed to reproduce within the confines of the
U.S. system the larger debate between parliamentary supremacy and
constrained parliamentarism. That is, people who were at heart committed to
parliamentary supremacy found themselves located in a political system with
some constraints on parliamentary power, and did the best they could by
arguing that courts should enforce only quite weak restrictions on legislative
power. Proponents of judicial activism argued in favor of more robust limits,
although the content of those limits varied with the political inclinations of the
proponents-some would have the courts actively protect liberal-leaning civil
rights, others would have the courts actively protect conservative-leaning
property rights.
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rights were protected. The extended U.S. experience, coupled with
the force of the U.S. example in worldwide constitutional
deliberations, has produced debates over activism and restraint in
constitutional systems that have moved toward constrained
parliamentarism. So, for example, Kent Roach has described how
critics of the Canadian Supreme Court have called it an activist
court. 7 Roach argues that it is misleading to transfer the U.S.
debate to the Canadian context, 8 and I want to use his argument to
open up a different discussion.
We can see the structure of the debate between judicial activism
and judicial restraint by returning to the contrast between
parliamentary supremacy and constrained parliamentarism.
Parliamentary supremacy actually had two forms, which I call
absolute and liberal. Under absolute parliamentary supremacy,
legislatures had the legal power to enact anything they wished, and
they had the practical power to do so because the political cultures
in which they were located did not acknowledge that legislative
authority was under moral, if not political, limits. Liberal regimes
with parliamentary supremacy were different. The legislature's
legal power was unlimited, but the political culture recognized
moral limits on what a legislature could properly do. 9 Sometimes a
government would propose a policy, and its opponents would argue
that the proposal should not be adopted because doing so would
violate moral (or prudential, or practical) limits on government
power recognized in the political culture. A liberal government
would respond, not that the objection was irrelevant because the
government had the sheer legal power to do whatever it wanted, but
rather that its proposal was consistent with those limits. That is,
interpretive debates occurred within liberal systems of
parliamentary supremacy, but they tended to be debates over the
proper interpretation of largely implicit cultural commitments
rather than over the interpretation of authoritative documents.
Constrained parliamentarism gives those interpretive debates a
somewhat different shape, and a definitively different venue. The
constraints in modern systems are written, so the debates are about
what the relevant documents mean.lO More interestingly, the
7. KENT ROACH, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM OR
DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE 3-5 (2001). Note the presence of the term activism in the
subtitle.
8. Id. at 69.
9. I do not insist on the term moral here; other terms, such as practical or
prudential, might do as well. The important point is that the political culture in
liberal systems of parliamentary supremacy in practice limited what
legislatures could actually do.
10. I use the plural here because sometimes the relevant documents
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debates take place in courts as well as in legislative fora. The latter
feature of constrained parliamentarism shaped the U.S. discussions
of judicial restraint and activism. The question that divided the
sides was, what weight should be given to the legislature's
resolution of the interpretive question? That is, proponents of
judicial restraint noted that, in enacting the challenged statute, the
legislature had-sometimes explicitly but always at least
implicitly-taken the view that the constitution, properly
interpreted, did not limit its power to enact the statute. Proponents
of judicial restraint argued that courts should give this legislative
interpretation substantial weight, on the assumption that
legislators were conscientiously attempting to discern and act within
the limits the constitution placed on them. Their critics were
skeptical about the seriousness with which legislatures took their
interpretive obligations, and, at the most general level, sometimes
argued that courts were required to arrive at interpretive judgments
independent of prior judgments by other political actors on the same
question.
Roach's analysis begins with the observation that the debate
between judicial activism and restraint is predicated on the
assumption that courts exercise strong-form judicial review, in
which the courts' interpretive judgments are final and unrevisable. ll
The modern articulation of strong-form judicial review is provided in
Cooper u. Aaron,12 where the U.S. Supreme Court described the
federal courts as "supreme in the exposition of the law of the
Constitution," and inferred from that a duty on legislatures to follow
the Court's interpretations. 13
A contemporary version came in City of Boerne u. Flores. 14 That
well-known case involved Congress' power to enact the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("the Act,,/5 pursuant to its power
to "enforce" the prohibitions placed on state governments by Section
One of the Fourteenth Amendment. 16 Previously, the Supreme
Court had interpreted the guarantees of religious exercise protected
by Section One to bar states from targeting religious exercises for
proscription, but otherwise to allow them to enforce general laws
that happened to have an adverse impact on religious exercise. 17
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act swept more broadly,
include international agreements such as the European Convention on Human
Rights as well as national constitutions.
11. ROACH, supra note 7, at 29. Of course, judicial finality can be overcome
through a difficult process of constitutional amendment.
12. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
13. Id. at 18.
14. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).
16. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 516-17.
17. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877-79 (1990).
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requiring states to have strong justifications even for general laws
that burdened religious exercise.
The question for the Court was whether the Act "enforced"
Section One. Analytically, one could take the position that the scope
of Section One is open to reasonable alternative interpretations, the
Supreme Court's prior interpretation being the first and Congress'
more recent one the second. On that view, the Act did enforce
Section One, when Section One received the interpretation Congress
gave it. The Supreme Court took a different view. 18 For the Court,
the only rights to be enforced were those the Court itself recognized.
According to the Court, "[l]egislation which alters the meaning of the
Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause.,,19 It
continued, "If Congress could define its own powers by altering the
Fourteenth Amendment's meaning, no longer would the
Constitution be 'superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary
means.",20
The deep assumption of strong-form review is found in the word
alter. A proponent of some other version of judicial review might
have written, "Congress has the power to specify the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment, at least so long as its specification is
reasonable, although different from the specification we ourselves
would provide." Similarly, that proponent might have written:
The Constitution defines the powers of Congress in broad
terms; when Congress provides a reasonable specification of
those terms' meaning in a particular context, courts should
give considerable weight to that judgment. This does not allow
Congress to alter the Fourteenth Amendment's meaning, but
merely follows from the Constitution's allocation of
interpretive power to both Congress and the courts.

This formulation shows the connection between the assumption that
the United States has strong-form judicial review, and the debate
over activism and restraint.
For Roach, the U.S. debates are misleading because constrained
parliamentarism now can take a weak form. Weak-form systems of
judicial review openly acknowledge the power of legislatures to
provide constitutional interpretations that differ from-or, in the
U.S.
Supreme
Court's terms,
alter-the constitutional
interpretations provided by the courts. Roach, a Canadian scholar,
18. No judge disagreed with the position taken in City of Boerne about the
finality to be given to the Court's interpretation of Section One, although
several justices expressed their disagreement with that interpretation.
19. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519 (emphasis added).
20. Id. at 529 (emphasis added) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803».
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concentrates on the role of section 33, the notwithstanding clause. 21
That provision allows a legislature to make effective a statute
"notwithstanding" the enumerated provisions of the Canadian
Charter of Rights ("Charter"). As Jeffrey Goldsworthy points out,
the precise formulation of the section 33 power may be
unfortunate. 22 Legislatures can invoke section 33 prospectivelythat is, before the courts have indicated that the new statute is
inconsistent with the courts' interpretation of Charter rights-Qr
after the courts have acted. 23 Invoking the section 33 power before
the courts have acted, legislatures must say to the public, ''We
believe that what we are about to do might well violate Charter
rights, but we want the statute to go into effect notwithstanding
that possible violation." Invoking the power after the courts have
acted, legislatures can easily be misled into saying, "Although the
statute does indeed violate Charter rights, as the courts have held,
we want the statute to be effective notwithstanding that violation."
What weak-form systems should do is highlight the possibility of
reasonable interpretive disagreement between courts and
legislatures. When invoked prospectively, the message should be,
''We are afraid that the courts will reasonably but erroneously
misinterpret the Charter to preclude us from enforcing this statute,
which we reasonably believe to be consistent with the Charter
properly interpreted. We invoke section 33 to insulate the statute
from a mistaken judicial interpretation.,,24 In this setting, it would
21. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. 1 (Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms), § 33. For further discussion, see Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Judicial
Review, Legislative Override, and Democracy, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 451
(2003).
22. Goldsworthy, supra note 21, at 468; see also Mark Tushnet, Policy
Distortion and Democratic Debilitation: Comparative Illumination of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 94 MICH. L. REV. 245, 279-80 (1995) (pointing
out the problems with the phrasing of section 33).
23. For the validation of prospective invocation, see Ford v. Quebec, (1988)
2 S.C.R. 712, 742-45 (Can.). The only other significant invocation of section 33
also has been prospective, in Alberta's insulation of its marriage statute from a
challenge based on equality claims by those seeking to establish gay marriages.
For a discussion, see ROACH, supra note 7, at 199-200. (I agree with
Goldsworthy's observation that the list of section 33 invocations by Tsvi Kahana
overstates the importance of the invocations she identifies. See Goldsworthy,
supra note 21, at 466-67 (discussing Tsvi Kahana, The Notwithstanding
Mechanism and Public Discussion: Lessons from the Ignored Practice of Section
33 of the Charter, 44 CAN. PUB. ADMIN. 255 (2001)).)
24. Formulating a provision that would allow legislatures to send this
message is not easy. One version would explicitly say that legislatures can
make statutes effective notwithstanding a judicial interpretation of
constitutional rights, but that version makes it difficult to invoke the provision
prospectively, in anticipation of a judicial decision projected from what the
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be clear that the language of judicial restraint or activism would be
misplaced. Rather, interpretive disagreements between courts and
legislatures would be at stake, which is in fact what the controversy
over activism and restraint is actually about anyway.
III.

TYPES OF WEAK-FORM JUDICIAL REVIEW

The "notwithstanding" clause provides the most studied
example of weak-form judicial review, and the one with which there
has been the most experience. There are other types of weak-form
review, however. Stephen Gardbaum has identified several, which
25
he calls the "new Commonwealth model" of constitutionalism. The
"new Commonwealth model" consists of instructions to courts that
they should construe legislation whenever fairly possible to be
consistent with constitutional norms, without giving them the power
to displace legislation that, once interpreted, is inconsistent with
those norms. 26 Gardbaum identifies the possibility that there may
be a variety of types of judicial review, lying along a continuum
measuring the strength of the judicial role relative to that of the
legislature.
The weakest form within the "new Commonwealth model" is the
courts have previously done. (Tushnet, supra note 22, at 279, suggested that
section 33 should have been interpreted to allow only retrospective invocations
of section 33, but I now regard that suggestion as mistaken; prospective
invocations can be useful where legislatures fear what courts might do.) The
trick lies in highlighting the fact that courts and legislatures can reasonably
disagree about how the constitution should be interpreted, and not giving
either's interpretation any necessary priority.
It should be noted that section 33 was developed rather late in the
process of drafting the Charter, and, while its proponents had a reasonably
clear idea of what they were trying to do, they may not have had time to draft
terms that would do precisely what they wanted-or, at least, what they should
have wanted.
25. Stephen
Gardbaum,
The
New
Commonwealth
Model
of
Constitutionalism, 49 AM. J. COMPo L. 707,710 (2001). I prefer to use the more
general label weak-form for the variants Gardbaum describes, largely because I
do not think that there is an intrinsic connection between the form of review
and the fact that the nations that have adopted weak-form systems of judicial
review are, or were, members of the British Commonwealth.
26. I think it worth emphasizing that I focus here on the effects of weakform statutes on the courts. Designers of weak-form systems typically also
include instructions to legislatures, in particular developing some mechanism
by which legislative proposals are vetted for constitutionality within the
legislative process before they are adopted. The British Human Rights Act
1998, for example, requires the minister responsible for introducing a bill to
declare either that the bill is compatible with the European Convention on
Human Rights, or that he or she is unable to make such a declaration. Human
Rights Act, 1998, C. 42, 19 (Eng.).

*
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pure interpretive requirement, for which the New Zealand Bill of
Rights Ace7 is the prime example. Here courts are charged only
with the new interpretive task. The British Human Rights Act
199828 is a somewhat stronger version. It directs courts to interpret
statutes in a manner that makes them consistent with the European
Convention on Human Rights ("the Convention"), if such a
construction is possible. Courts unable to do so may declare the
statute incompatible with the Convention. The minister responsible
for the statute's enforcement is then authorized to invoke a fasttrack procedure for enacting a new statute that would be compatible
with the Convention or even, in special circumstances, to place in
force a revised statute pending its enactment by Parliament.
That the pure interpretive requirement is a form of judicial
review can be seen by comparing what happens to a statute in a
system without such a requirement to what happens in a system
with one. Suppose the courts, without an interpretive requirement,
routinely interpret statutes according to their plain language on the
theory that the statute's language is the surest guide to the
purposes the legislature sought to achieve. That is, the courts say,
in effect, ''You told us what you wanted to do in the statute's plain
language, and that's what we will do." Add on the interpretive
requirement, and the courts say something quite different:
The language of this statute tells us what you wanted to do,
but if we did that you would be violating constitutional norms.
You've also told us that you don't want to do that. So, we'll
interpret the statute to be consistent with constitutional
norms, even though that leads us to enforce a statute that does
something other than what the statutory language says you
wanted to do.29

Weak-form judicial review in the form of an interpretive mandate
27. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, 1990 (N.Z.).
28. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.).
29. Two points should be noted: (1) The analysis does not depend on the
particular "plain language" theory of interpretation I have used in the example.
All that matters is that courts acting under the interpretive requirement will do
something they would not do absent such a requirement; (2) Analytic problems
arise in connection with statutes enacted before and after the "new model" of
judicial review is adopted. For those enacted earlier, the difficulty is that the
legislature cannot be said to have wanted the courts to accommodate the
legislature's purposes to the (newly enforceable) constitutional norms. For
those enacted afterwards (particularly those enacted with a ministerial
statement of compatibility), the difficulty is that the legislature may have
believed that its statute was consistent with constitutional norms (and the
legislature's judgment should be given some weight), or the legislature may
have wanted the statute to be enforced even though it was inconsistent with
those norms.
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gives the courts an effect on policy that is different from the effect
they have using their traditional methods of statutory
interpretation.
Government of South Africa v. Grootboom 30 of South Africa's
Constitutional Court provides another variant, which itself can be
seen as a version of a broader type of weak-form judicial review that
Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel identify with what they call
democratic experimentalism. 31 Grootboom involved a challenge to
South Africa's housing policy, which was said to be inconsistent with
the constitution's guarantee of a right to housing. 32 To escape the
"appalling" conditions of their residences, a group of people moved
onto land designated by the government for subsidized low-cost
housing, which had not, however, been constructed yet. 33 They were
evicted from the land, and challenged the Novernment's policy,
which had not produced any housing for them. The Constitutional
Court upheld the challenge. 35 It did not direct that housing be
provided to the challengers, however. Its precise holding was that
the government's housing policy was unconstitutional because it
lacked a component to deal with the housing needs of those in
desperate need-that is, the plaintiffs. 36 The court's remedy was to
direct the government to revise its policy to include such a
component, even while acknowledging that the litigants might not
themselves benefit from the revised policy.37
Dorf and Sabel treat approaches like that taken in Grootboom
as exemplifying a distinctive variant of weak-form judicial review,
part of a group of legal techniques they call democratic
experimentalism. 38 A democratic experimentalist court begins with
a constitutional principle stated at a reasonably high level of
abstraction, such as the South African provision purporting to
guarantee access to adequate housing. It begins the experimentalist
project by offering an incomplete specification of the principle's
meaning in a particular context, such as the requirement that the
government's housing programs specifically address the housing
needs of those in desperate need. The court then asks legislators
and executive officials to develop and begin to implement plans that
30. 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (S. Afr.).
31. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998).
32. 2000 (11) BCLR enen 1-2.
33. Id. en 3.
34. Id. enen 3-4.
35. Id. en 99.
36. Id. en 95.
37. Id. en 96. The following paragraph is drawn from Mark Tushnet, State
Action, Social Welfare Rights, and the Judicial Role: Some Comparative
Observations, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 435 (2002).
38. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 31.
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have a reasonable prospect of fulfilling the incompletely specified
constitutional requirement. The next step involves examining the
results of this experiment. Perhaps legislators and executive
officials will be able to demonstrate that their programs are moving
in the right direction. A democratic experimentalist court might
respond by fleshing out the constitutional requirement a bit more,
specifying in somewhat more detail what the government must do to
fulfill its broad obligation to ensure access to adequate housing. Or,
perhaps legislators and executive officials will be able to show that
the task they initially set for themselves in response to the court's
first decision could not be accomplished within a reasonable time, or
with reasonable resources, and propose some modification in the
constitutional standard. For example, they might have proposed to
build permanent housing for those in desperate need, but, having
discovered that land is unavailable at a reasonable cost for such
purposes, propose now to develop temporary shelters for those
people.
A democratic experimentalist court could revise its
judgment about the constitution's requirements in light of
experience. Notably, that adjustment might be upward, imposing
more requirements on the government, or downward, imposing
fewer. The revisability of a court's constitutional judgments makes
this a weak-form version of judicial review.
I think it worth emphasizing that Grootboom and democratic
experimentalist judicial review should be understood as providing
general variants of weak-form judicial review. The social-welfare
context in which Grootboom arose might make weak-form judicial
review particularly attractive in light of widespread misgivingsamong constitutionalists familiar only with strong-form systems of
judicial review-about judicial enforcement of social-welfare rights. 39
But, weak-form judicial review in the form of planning or
experimentalism might be appropriate in more traditional civil
liberties contexts as well. Consider free expression, for example.
One might balk at adopting experimentalist approaches to the
question of regulating political dissent. 40 The cases of regulating the
39. See Tushnet, supra note 37 (discussing those misgivings and arguing
that they are not well-founded).
40. See Richard A. Epstein, Classical Liberalism Meets the New
Constitutional Order: A Comment on Mark Tushnet, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 455, 464
(2002). I believe that Epstein might be correct in being nervous about using
experimentalist approaches in connection with traditional First Amendment
doctrine regarding political dissent, but only because judicial experience has
been sufficiently thick that we can fairly say that experiments conducted in the
past have produced near definitive results.
Put another way, an
experimentalist might describe the common-law-like evolution of constitutional
doctrine dealing with the regulation of political dissent as an example of
experimentalism rather than seeing the application of the doctrine in its
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Internet, or regulating campaign finance, might be different,
though. There, experience with forms of regulation is thinner, the
problems are either new, or take new forms, or are complex in ways
not readily seen until regulatory systems are put in place. Rather
than invoke traditional doctrines that ask whether a regulation is
content-based or content-neutral, courts might profitably require
that governments develop coherent plans for regulation, or engage
in the kind of interactive process with legislatures contemplated by
democratic experimentalism. 41

IV.

THE POSSIBLE DEGENERATION OR ESCAlATION OF
WEAK-FORM JUDICIAL REVIEW

Systems of weak-form judicial review are attractive objects of
study, if only because they provide an opportunity to think about
judicial review outside the tired categories of activism and
restraint. 42 But, are they truly distinctive systems? I suggest some
reasons for thinking that weak-form systems may be unstable in
practice. That is, they may well be transformed in either directionreducing their scope so that weak-form systems are actually systems
of parliamentary supremacy (and thereby reproducing the worry
about inadequate protection of liberal rights), or expanding their
scope so that weak-form systems are actually strong-form systems
(and thereby reproducing the worry about interfering with
democratic self-governance). The thought here is that, while there
may be in theory a continuum of forms of judicial review, in
practical operation of institutions in the real world, institutions are
likely to cluster near the poles of u.S.-style strong-form review and
traditional parliamentary sovereignty, with very little judicial
review.
Notably, these possibilities are open for each system, and the
tension within my arguments should be emphasized at the outset. I
will be producing arguments explaining why a weak-form system
might become a system of parliamentary supremacy, and why that
exact same system might become a strong-form system. Obviously,
the arguments cannot both be correct with respect to every
current, apparently final form as a refutation of experimentalism.
41. For a suggestion regarding campaign finance regulation that I regard
as compatible with democratic experimentalist theory, see William P. Marshall,
The Last Best Chance for Campaign Finance Reform, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 335,
390 (2000) (suggesting that states be allowed to develop campaign finance
regulations under standards that might differ from those applied to the
national government).
42. I doubt that they can readily be emulated in the United States, where
the structure of judicial review and, perhaps more important, the legal culture
seem to support strong-form review with little qualification.
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constitutional question presented to the courts. Perhaps only one of
the arguments I develop is correct with respect to any particular
national system. Or, more interestingly, perhaps a weak-form
system will degenerate into parliamentary supremacy with respect
to some questions, and escalate into a strong-form system with
respect to other questions. 43
Another preliminary is that the actual operation of weak-form
systems may be highly dependent on context. I will discuss some
implications of political organization in the course of dealing with
section 33, but dependency on historical circumstances is worth
noting at the start. The basic idea is that a constitutional system's
early experiences with judicial review may set the constitutional
culture on a distinctive path. In the United States, for example, it is
said that Chief Justice John Marshall's assertion of the power of
judicial review in Marbury v. Madison 44 established strong-form
review in the United States because, basically, he got away with it. 45
GDldsworthy and I both suggest that Canadian legislatures have
been reluctant to use the section 33 power because that power was
discredited by its invocation by Quebec to insulate all Quebec
legislation from review under the Charter. 46 Its most recent use, to
forestall a contemplated decision finding that provinces giving
heterosexual marriage legal status must give the same status to gay
malTIages, seems unlikely to lend more luster to the section 33
power.
In the other direction, it will be interesting to see how the South
African constitutional system reacts to Grootboom, which imposed a
rather mild planning requirement on the government, and the
nevirapine case, which imposed a somewhat more substantial
requirement. 47 There the government had limited the provision of
nevirapine, an effective drug treatment against the transmission of
HIV from pregnant mothers to their children. 46 The government
43. If so, perhaps we might end up thinking that the system is weak-form
"on balance"; that is, as interpreted within the nation's constitutional culture,
even though there is no single question on which judicial review actually takes
a weak form.
44. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
45. For one version of this account, see ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE
AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 25 (revised by Sanford Levinson, 3d. ed. 2000)
(describing Marbury as "a masterwork of indirection, a brilliant example of
Marshall's capacity to ... advance in one direction while his opponents are
looking in another").
46. Goldsworthy, supra note 21, at 464-65; Tushnet, supra note 22, at 29597.
47. Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (10) BCLR
1033 91 135 (S. Afr.).
48. [d. 919110-11.

HeinOnline -- 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 825 2003

826

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

made the drug available at a few experimental sites, where it also
provided counseling on nevirapine use, breast-feeding, and other
matters relevant to reducing the risk of mother-to-child
transmission ofHIV. 49
The Constitutional Court held that the government had to
rethink its plan for preventing mother-to-child transmission of
HIV.50 The court agreed that monitoring nevirapine administration
at a limited number of research sites made "good sense from the
public health point ofview,,,51 but observed that such monitoring was
not inconsistent with administering the drug more widely, at sites
where no research-monitoring occurred. 52 The new comprehensive
plan had to include extending the provision of nevirapine from the
limited number of sites to all public facilities, and expanding the
training of counselors at all public facilities to include counseling on
the use of the drug. 53 The court's language suggests that the
comprehensive plan might have to go even farther, although the
court did not specify further details.
The nevirapine case illustrates the path-dependence of judicial
review. Although nothing to this effect appears in the opinion,
South African legal elites knew that the government's policy was
motivated in large measure by President Thabo Mbeki's expressed
view that AIDS was not caused by HIV. Further, the government's
litigation posture was weak: Nevirapine had passed through the
ordinary processes for the approval of drugs, indicating that its use
was not dangerous, the government conceded that providing
nevirapine to all women using public facilities would not be
excessively expensive,54 and the government conceded that
counselors already present at public hospitals could include
nevirapine counseling in their programs. Finally, the government
had decided to make nevirapine generally available by the time the
Constitutional Court decided the case.
In short, the nevirapine case was a perfect one for exercising
judicial review. The government's position was discredited and had
been abandoned. The Constitutional Court could pretty much do
whatever it wanted in the case. One can imagine a next stage in
which Grootboom and the nevirapine case become precedents for
insisting that substantial plans be developed and implemented. The

49.
50.
51.
52.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

14-15.
124-33.
'II 15.
'II 68.
53. [d. 'II 135.
54. According to the plaintiffs, nevirapine had been "offered to the
government for free." [d. 'II 11.
'11'11
'11'11
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nevirapine case in particular might be assimilated into South
Africa's constitutional culture as an example of the effective use of
strong-form judicial review. But perhaps not. Perhaps the culture
will take as more important the unusual circumstances of the
nevirapine case, treat the case as a sport, and give judicial review a
weak form again. 55

A

Degenerating Into Parliamentary Supremacy
Accustomed to strong-form judicial review, U.S. scholars may be
particularly attracted to the idea that weak-form judicial review is
fundamentally a sham, parliamentary supremacy parading under
the guise of effective judicial review. The Human Rights Act might
offer such skeptics a strong example, but the problem can arise in all
systems of weak-form review. Consider a statute adopted after a
minister makes a statement of compatibility, reflecting the
government's judgment that the statute is consistent with the
European Convention. A court comes along and issues a declaration
of incompatibility. True, the minister now has the authority to
introduce fast-track legislation to modify the statute, and the
commentary routinely asserts that everyone expects such a
response. But, why should a minister use that authority? If the
statute is one to which the government is committed in principle,
the minister and the government can express their disagreement
with the courts on the interpretive question-as to which they had
already expressed their views in the statement of compatibilityand insist on enforcing the statute as adopted. 56
Grootboom and related approaches can degenerate into
55. Of course, the South African Constitutional Court has exercised strongform judicial review in more traditional civil liberties cases. That, too, might
push it away from adopting weak-form review in some restricted subset of
constitutional cases. (The obvious candidate for such a subset is social welfare
rights, but, as I argued briefly above, there is no reason in principle to restrict
weak-form review to social welfare rights.)
56. For a qualification, see infra text accompanying notes 72, 74-75.
Another qualification, for a government truly insistent on achieving its
purposes, is that the European Convention itself authorizes governments to
derogate from its provisions under quite limited circumstances. A government
could introduce legislation conceding its incompatibility with the Convention
and simultaneously derogating from the Convention with respect to such
legislation. (That is what the Blair government did in introducing the AntiTerrorism, Crime, and Security Act, 2001, c. 24 (Eng.).) It is an open question
whether the British courts could review the question whether the conditions for
derogation as set out in the Convention were satisfied, although I assume that
the European Court on Human Rights can do so. For a brief discussion, see
Mark Tushnet, Nonjudicial Review, 40 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. (forthcoming July
2003).
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parliamentary supremacy as welL On its face Grootboom requires
only that the government submit a plan for public housing that
contains a component dealing with the desperately needy.
Grootboom itself would be satisfied once the government has
submitted such a plan. That is, the government can fully comply
with Grootboom by developing a plan that it has no intention of
implementing. The plan would be like the Soviet five-year plans,
existing on paper but having no beneficial real-world impact. These
sorts of paper rights are not unknown in constitutional law. The
Supreme Court of India, for example, has been extremely aggressive
in articulating a wide range of constitutional rights. But, according
to one observer, that court operates "in almost metaphysical
isolation from social reality.,,57
Perhaps more interesting, because more likely, is nominal
compliance with a weak-form court's requirements, followed by a
judicial declaration of victory and retreat from the field. Two
examples are instructive. The New Jersey Supreme Court engaged
in a long-term effort to increase the supply of housing for the poor,
by finding that localities were constitutionally obligated to bear
their "fair share" of such housing. 58
Acting in a roughly
experimentalist way, the court invited a range of responses from
legislatures, on both the local and the state levels, rather than
specifying how "fair shares" should be determined and distributed. 59
Not surprisingly, many suburban jurisdictions strenuously resisted
taking on the "fair share" obligation. 60 After a long series of
exchanges, the New Jersey Supreme Court declared itself satisfied
with the legislative responses, despite the fact that low-income
housing remained pretty much in the same supply as had existed
before the court began to act. 61
Roach provides a Canadian example, particularly dramatic
because of the forgone possibility of utilizing section 33 in response
to a Canadian Supreme Court decision with which the legislature
disagreed. O'Connor u. The Queen 62 involved a prosecution for rape
of four women in a residential school that occurred decades before
the prosecution. 63 The defendant demanded access to the records
57. Jamie Cassels, Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in
India: Attempting the Impossible?, 37 AM. J. COMPo L. 495, 515 (1989).
58. CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SEIGE: RACE, SPACE, AND AUDACIOUS
JUDGES 20-21 (1996).
59. Id. at 26-28.
60. Id. at 111.
61. For an overview, see especially id. at 124-25 (describing the New Jersey
Supreme Court's "expressed intent to defer to the council" and its "continuing
desire, almost a need, to assert judge-made policy").
62. [1995] 103 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (Can.).
63. Id. at 2.
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compiled during counseling· sessions with the victims. 64 The
Canadian Supreme Court decided, by a vote of 5 to 4, that the
defendant had an unqualified right to all records in the
prosecution's possession, and that the defendant could get access to
possibly relevant records in the hands of doctors and rape crisis
counselors if the trial court determined they should be made
available after balancing the defendant's right to present a defense
against the victims' rights to privacy.65 The dissenters would have
required the defendant to make a substantially stronger showing of
need before gaining access to records in private hands. 66
The Canadian Parliament responded to O'Connor with new
legislation that, according to Roach, "followed the dissent... by
subjecting all records ... to a two-stage process that balances the
accused's rights against the complainant's privacy and equality
rights and the social interest in encouraging the reporting of sexual
assaults.,,67 And, like the dissent, the statute enumerated "ten
allegations that, alone or together, were not sufficient to establish
that a record was relevant.,,66 The Canadian Supreme Court found
that the new legislation satisfied the Charter. 69 Saving face, it
characterized O'Connor as a common-law decision, not one resting
on the defendant's rights under the Charter, and asserted that the
new legislation was, like the court's earlier "common law" rule, a
reasonable specification of the protected right to present a defense. 7o
Roach, a specialist in criminal law and procedure, believes that the
legislation was indeed inconsistent with O'Connor, and that it would
have been better for the court to say so and invite the legislature to
use its power under section 33 to override a judicial interpretation of
the Charter. 71
The Canadian cases illustrate a problem common to weak-form
and strong-form systems, but which takes on particular resonance in
weak-form systems. The problem is that courts are not insensitive
to the political responses to their actions. 72 Sometimes they retreat
Id.
65. Id. at 6-7.
66. Id. at 17-18.
67. ROACH, supra note 7, at 278.
68. Id.
69. L.C. v. Mills, [1999] 139 C.C.C. (3d) 321, 339-40 (Can.).
70. Id. at 338-40, 353-54, 357-58, 390-91. If the initial decision was fairly
described as a common-law decision, then the sequence of cases and legislation
does not illustrate the operation of any form of judicial review at all, but only
the ordinary and well-established practice of legislation consistent with the
constitution displacing the common law.
71. ROACH, supra note 7, at 279-81.
72. In the United States, the Supreme Court's reaction to congressional
64.
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from advanced positions but attempt to conceal their capitulation to
political disagreement by insisting that the new cases are truly and
fairly distinguishable from the older ones. These retreats can be
described as reinstituting systems of parliamentary supremacy with
respect to the rights at issue. In strong-form systems of judicial
review, perhaps such retreats are sometimes necessary if the courts
are to retain their power to overturn other legislation. What is
striking is that weak-form systems purport to make such retreats
unnecessary, because legislatures have the means at hand to reject
the courts' decisions. Perhaps we can describe weak-form systems
as degenerating when the retreats occur in such systems
nonetheless.
The section 33 power suggests another way in which weak-form
systems can degenerate. Defenders of Canada's system of judicial
review have asserted that it promotes dialogue between the courts
and the legislature. 73 I discuss some aspects of that dialogue below.
For now, consider two types of "dialogue"-really, different
monologues. First, sometimes a legislature will pass a statute that,
on reflection, its members think ill-considered. The courts can
invalidate the statute, and the legislature will do nothing in
response even though it has the power to override the courts'
decision. The reason is that the legislature, on reflection, agrees
with the courts. This, sometimes called the "sober second thought"
effect, is a real benefit of judicial review, whether strong- or weakform. Second, suppose that the legislature routinely invoked its
power to override the courts whenever a court invalidated a
statute. 74 Weak-form review, under those circumstances, would be
indistinguishable from parliamentary supremacy. 75 Weak-form
disapproval of a number of 1957 decisions involving the free speech rights of
alleged Communists is an oft-cited example. See, e.g., LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE
WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 137 (2000) (describing two 1958 cases as
"[tlhe Court's major peace offering" to Congress). The conventional story is that
the Court followed up those cases by retreating from the protections it
articulated, and upheld prosecutions that it would have barred earlier.
73. The most prominent work is Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Bushell, The
Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures, 35 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 75
(1997), which has generated substantial responsive literature.
74. Of course, routine use of the power to override would occur only because
of the political culture's understanding of the courts' role in the constitutional
system.
75. As has most of the literature on judicial review, I have ignored the
possibility of constitutional amendment as a response to judicial decisions.
Constitutions that have judicial review, whether strong- or weak-form, and easy
amendment processes, are similarly systems of parliamentary supremacy-so
long as the political culture imposes no practical barriers to invoking the
amendment process.
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review supports true dialogue only when the legislature actually
does respond to judicial decisions, but only on occasion.
There are, then, predictable ways in which weak-form systems
of judicial review can be ineffectual. Next, I consider some
predictable ways in which such systems can become strong-form
systems in effect, if not in formal, law.
B.

Escalating Into Strong-Form Review
Weak-form systems of judicial review seem attractive to some
because they provide an opportunity for judicial oversight of
legislation without displacing the ultimate power of legislatures to
determine public policy. That possibility would be illusory, though,
if weak-form review in practice turned out to be as final as strongform review is in theory.76 How might weak-form review escalate
into strong-form review? Each version of weak-form review might
be transformed through routes characteristic of the version.
Consider first Grootboom and experimentalist approaches. The
conceptualization of these approaches as weak-form review is
relatively new, but the approaches themselves are less novel than
one might think. The New Jersey experience with low-income
housing is representative of a broader phenomenon of institutional
litigation in the United States; that is, litigation aimed at
transforming the routine operation of large-scale government
bureaucracies such as social service agencies and, notably, prisons.
The course of such litigation is reasonably clear. As we have
seen, sometimes the courts declare victory and go home, with
nothing much accomplished. Sometimes, though, the courts take
the task of institutional transformation seriously.77 They begin by
observing gross violations of core constitutional rights, and direct
the institutions to stop. The institutions are either recalcitrant,
believing that what they have been doing is essential to carrying out
their assigned missions, or incompetent, unable to develop
mechanisms for performing their missions that do not violate
constitutional rights. Courts respond by developing increasingly
precise requirements for the institutions. The reason is twofold.
When dealing with recalcitrant institutions, courts can monitor
compliance with these requirements more easily than they can
monitor compliance with general directives to stop behaving badly.
76. Of course the form of judicial review might remain the same, but when
weak-form review escalates it loses its distinctive capacity to constrain the
legislature and the courts through a process of dialogue and reconsideration.
77. The most comprehensive discussion and analysis of modern
institutional litigation in the United States is MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD
L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: How THE COURTS
REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS (1998).
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When dealing with incompetent institutions, courts can use detailed
requirements to show even incompetents what they need to do.
Something similar might happen with Grootboom-like planning
requirements. The court directs the government to develop a plan
and begin to implement it. The plaintiffs come back to court, saying
that the plan is inadequate in various respects, and that the
implementation is flawed. The court responds by insisting that the
plan be augmented to deal with the inadequacies and flaws. In the
next round, new inadequacies and flaws are exposed, and the court
again tries to get the plan to work.
The U.S. experience with school desegregation is instructive.
After holding that segregation by law was unconstitutional, the
Supreme Court directed lower courts to supervise the development
of plans by school boards to desegregate their schools "with all
deliberate speed.,,78 School boards came up with a variety of plans,
including plans that would desegregate one grade per year and
plans that allowed students to choose which schools they would
attend. The courts initially accepted most of these plans. Plaintiffs
returned to court to point out that under the plans as implemented
schools remained as racially identifiable as ever. Courts responded
by ratcheting up the requirements. Eventually the U.S. Supreme
Court demanded that school boards come up with plans that
"promise[d] realistically to work, and promise[d] realistically to
work now.'079 Lower courts took this injunction seriously, adopting
plans that specified school operations in enormous detail. 80
What deserves emphasis here is that the processes I have
sketched are entirely consistent with the general description of
experimentalist judicial review.
Courts specify constitutional
requirements at a relatively high level of generality, observe how
the institution responds, and adjust their constitutional
specifications accordingly. In the end, we end up with courts
micromanaging the institutions-just in the way a court exercising
strong-form review would.
Next, consider the section 33 process in Canada. Roach's work
shows that critics of Canada's Supreme Court believe that it has
engaged in strong-form and activist judicial review. The quite
limited use of section 33 itself suggests that there is little difference
between the Canadian system and one in which the Constitutional

78. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
79. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968).
80. The poster child for such plans was at issue in Missouri v. Jenkins, 515
U.S. 70 (1995), where the Court substantially limited the power of district
courts to require large-scale program revisions to ensure, in the district courts'
view, that desegregation plans "worked." [d. at 101-02.
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Court's decisions are final.
As Goldsworthy points out, the reasons for section 33's
desuetude are unclear, although the path-dependency mentioned
above probably plays a large part. 8! Defenders of Canada's system
as weak-form despite the rare use of the section 33 power make two
points. First, they point out that the failure to invoke section 33
does not show that Canada has a strong-form system. Legislatures
might not invoke section 33 because, having listened to the Supreme
Court, they decide that the court's interpretation of the Charter is
correct. Democratic responsibility for Charter-interpretation is
preserved, on this argument, because legislatures ultimately
endorse the court's interpretations.
Second, they note that
sometimes legislatures do respond to Supreme Court decisions by
re-enacting new versions of the statutes the court invalidated,
altering them to meet the court's objections. In this way, according
to Peter Hogg, the government achieves (most of) its policy
objectives at smaller cost to Charter rights. 82 Each of these
arguments can be questioned.
Legislatures might not use the section 33 power because they
agree with the courts' interpretations, it is true, but they may also
fail to use the power because they are unable to use it. The reason
lies in the structure of the legislative process. That structure is
more clearly exposed in a separation-of-powers system than in a
parliamentary system, but, after making the point in the easier
context, I will show how the argument goes in parliamentary
systems. The general problem is that the legislative process has a
number of what political scientists call "veto points," places where
less than a majority of the legislature can stop legislative proposals
from going forward. In the United States, legislative committees, or
even sub-committees, can be veto points. 83 Forty Senators constitute
a veto point for most legislation as well, given recent changes in
Senate norms regarding the propriety of filibusters. And, of course,
the President has a formal veto power. Legislative inaction-of any
sort, including the failure to invoke the override power-thus cannot
be taken to represent a legislative judgment that the proposal (to
override a court decision, for example) is ill-considered. Inaction
81. Goldsworthy, supra note 21, at 466-69.
82. See Hogg & Bushnell, supra note 73, at 85.
83. Note, for example, that judicial nominations in the United States
Senate do not go forward until the Senate Committee on the Judiciary holds a
hearing on the nomination, and that scheduling a hearing is entirely in the
hands of the Committee's chair. Similarly, a nomination does not go to the full
Senate if a majority of the Committee votes against the nomination. Obviously,
the Committee majority may-but need not-be representative of the Senate as
a whole.
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may result from the exercise of power by a minority strategically
located at a veto point.
Canada's parliamentary system appears-but only appears-to
have fewer veto points. As a matter of formal law, a government
can impose party discipline on its members and deploy its majority
to enact anything the Prime Minister and Cabinet care enough
about. So, one might think, the failure to invoke section 33 in
Canada does indeed show that legislatures do not disagree strongly
enough with court interpretations to do anything about them. But,
here the formal law is misleading. Parliamentary majorities are
actually coalitions, sometimes formal but sometimes informal.
Imposing party discipline is politically costly-which means that a
prime minister who does so with respect to one proposal will
inevitably find it more difficult to assemble a legislative majority for
some other proposal. 84 Failure to invoke the section 33 power does
not mean that a majority approved of the courts' interpretation. It
means only that the government surveyed the political terrain and
decided that it would lose more on other important issues if it
imposed party discipline to override the courts. Weak-form judicial
review is supposed to impose political costs on the government by
drawing public attention to the possibility that the government has
violated constitutional rights. But, it imposes other political costs as
well, not inherent in the theory of weak-form review but inherent in
the structure of policy-making, as it induces the government to
change its policy priorities. These costs may be sufficient to convert
a decision that nominally can be overridden into one that is
effectively final. 85
Judicial interpretations also impose a policy cost on
84. After the Canadian Supreme Court's abortion decision, the government
introduced legislation that would have changed the nation's abortion law in a
way that would have complied with the Court's requirements but would have
still restricted the availability of abortions substantially. Anticipating the
political costs of imposing party discipline, at a crucial point the government
decided to allow a free vote-that is, informed members of the majority party in
Parliament that they were free to vote their consciences on the proposal without
regard to the fact that it was supported by the Prime Minister and Cabinet.
The proposal failed on an evenly divided vote. For a description of the voting
process, see F.L. MORTON, PRO-CHOICE vs. PRo-LIFE: ABORTION AND THE COURTS
IN CANADA 290-93 (1992).
85. A defender of weak-form review could reply that a failure to override
demonstrates that the government simply does not care enough about the
substantive constitutional issue. But this means only that effecting the
government's continued views of constitutional rights will impose policy losses
in some other area that the government regards as more important. The point
here is that the judiciary may succeed in imposing its views within the
constitutional domain because of the government's concerns about issues
outside that domain.
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government, which proponents of weak-form judicial review as
dialogue undervalue. Consider legislation adopted in response to
court decisions invalidating earlier legislation or interpreting it
distinctively because of constitutional concerns, and clearly
consistent with those decisions.
The new legislation cannot
accomplish precisely what the earlier one did, because the enhanced
protection of constitutional values necessarily reduces the statute's
policy-effectiveness relative to the original. The reason is that the
new legislation will incorporate rules directed by the courts, and
rules are inevitably overinclusive with respect to their purposes. 86
Overinclusiveness means that the new statute will inhibit the
accomplishment of the valid goals the legislature seeks to advance,
and not merely the accomplishment of those goals when doing so
would directly impair constitutional values.
Statutes authorizing searches provide a good example. Suppose
a court finds that a statute authorizing a search for evidence of
terrorist activities sets the standard for conducting such searches
too low. The legislature responds by enacting a statute that
requires evidence prior to the search of the sort the court thought
necessary. We can assume that in many cases, perhaps even the
vast majority, diligent work by investigators can produce that
evidence, and the searches will occur. It may seem that the court
has protected civil liberties at no cost to law enforcement, because
investigators get authorization to search every time they ask. That
appearance is misleading. The extra effort the investigators make
to satisfY the new statute's requirements-that is, the court's
requirements-is effort that might have been devoted to other
investigations. In short, law enforcement is impaired by searches
forgone because of the time and effort spent in complying with the
court's requirements.
This point is quite general. Statutes pursue a complex set of
goals, including substantive goals like law enforcement and costrelated goals like catching crooks at a level of expense the public
finds acceptable. Any change in a statute amounts to a change in
the goals the statute pursues. Judicial interpretations to which
legislatures respond by changing their statutes also change the mix
of public policies the legislature seeks. Such interpretations have
the policy effects associated with strong-form judicial review.
Perhaps these policy effects could be avoided by enacting a new
statute. But, apart from the fact that the legislature has already
enacted the statute that in its view best accommodates
constitutional values and non-constitutional policies, doing so faces
86. They are also inevitably underinclusive, but underinclusiveness does
not impair the policy goals initially sought by the legislature.
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two additional problems.
First, consider the interpretive
instructions in the new Commonwealth model of judicial review. As
noted earlier, courts acting pursuant to these interpretive
instructions change the policy goals effectively implemented by a
statute's plain language, to ensure that the statute complies with
constitutional norms. They say, "This statute must be taken to
mean the following, because otherwise it would violate
constitutional norms." How can a legislature respond? Of course it
can modify the statute, but suppose it disagrees with the courts'
assessment of what the constitutional norms require. The only
response, it would seem, would be to reenact the statute, perhaps
with a new provision saying so, pretty much in terms like, "And we
really mean it!" Such a response seems to me quite unlikely, and
might even be ineffective because the statute as initially enacted
should have been taken by the courts in the first place as expressing
the legislature's policy goals.
Second, enacting a new statute requires the expenditure of
political resources. Even if the government gets exactly what it
wants in the new statute, doing so takes time away from pursuing
other legislative initiatives. Something falls off the bottom of the
agenda when the government has to put re-enacting the statute on
the agenda. That is a real cost to social policy, albeit one quite
difficult to observe.
The British Human Rights Act 1998 might escalate into strongform judicial review for another reason-its insertion into a legal
system in which British statutes are subject to review by the
European Court on Human Rights ("European Court"). The
conventional wisdom is that Parliament will respond to a judicial
declaration of incompatibility by modifying the challenged statute,
and one of the reasons given is that Parliament would not want to
be embarrassed by a decision from the European Court confirming
the British courts' assessment.
That reason is probably a good one, but why it is is not as
After all, the British courts'
obvious as it might seem.
determination is only a prediction about what the European Court
would do if it got hold of the statute. Parliament might disagree
with the British courts' prediction, in which case it ought to be
willing to take its chances on an appeal to Strasbourg.
The structure of European human rights law might make the
British courts' predictive judgments self-fulfilling, in which case
their declarations of incompatibility would be the equivalent of
exercises of strong-form judicial review. The reason is that
European human rights law assesses whether a signatory's law is
consistent with the European Convention by applying a "margin of
appreciation." The "margin of appreciation" doctrine responds to the
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observation that the signatories have different policy preferences,
face different problems, and have different values that intersect
with more general human rights norms even if those values are not
inconsistent with such norms. The "margin of appreciation"
doctrine gives some deference to a government's claim that the
statute at issue should be taken to be consistent with the
Convention once the European Court considers the nation's
distinctive circumstances and characteristics. 87
The "margin of appreciation" doctrine might make a British
court's determination that a statute is inconsistent with the
Convention self-fulfilling, because it might well affect the degree of
deference the European Court is willing to give to a claim by the
British executive branch that its statute responds to something
special about Britain. After all, the European Court will have
available to it a determination by a British institution that the
statute violates the Convention. That gives the European Court a
choice between British institutions to which it might defer, and,
courts being courts, one can fairly expect the European Court to
respect the British courts more than it will respect the British
executive.
I should emphasize that I have sketched reasons and processes
by which weak-form judicial review might escalate into strong-form
review. But, as the section on the degeneration of weak-form review
into parliamentary supremacy indicates, there is nothing inevitable
here. We need more experience with weak-form systems before we
can arrive at a judgment with any degree of confidence that
compares them to weak-form systems. 88

V. CONCLUSION
Weak-form systems of judicial review are intriguing. With the
demise of parliamentary supremacy as a system constitutionalists
are willing to defend forcefully, weak-form judicial review provides
constitution designers a new choice within the universe of
constrained parliamentarism. I have suggested here some reasons
for thinking that weak-form systems of judicial review might not
provide a permanent resolution of the worry that unconstrained

87. The degree of deference varies; the "margin of appreciation" will be
smaller if the human rights norm invoked has been given a specification that
has received nearly universal acceptance within Europe.
88. I should note, though, my judgment that we have enough experience
with the Canadian system to conclude that it is much closer to a strong-form
system than the most avid defenders of the section 33 process believe, even
taking into account the supposed contributions weak-form review makes to
dialogues between courts and legislatures.
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parliamentarism is insufficiently attentive to human rights, or of
the worry that strong-form systems of judicial review are in tension
with the values of democratic self-governance. Still, thinking about
weak-form systems is certainly more interesting than reproducing
the discussion of judicial activism and restraint in the context of
new institutions. Perhaps weak-form systems of judicial review
provide more in the way of academic interest than they contribute to
solving practical problems of governance. 89 An academic will not
take that as a criticism of weak-form judicial review.

89. My view is that constitution-designers should spend less time tinkering
with institutions of judicial review and more time in thinking through the ways
in which legislatures might be structured internally to respond to the
constraints properly placed on democratic decision-making, and concomitantly
the ways in which a political culture might assist citizens and legislators in
internalizing those constraints.
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